The Argentina-US trade agreement turns the RIGI into a mega investment protection treaty
by Luciana Ghiotto
The agreement, which still has to be approved by the Argentine Congress, will give the Incentives Regime for Large Investments (RIGI) a central role, converting it into a mechanism to satisfy the appetites of US corporations.
On 4 February 2026, in Washington, the United States (US) and Argentina signed a Reciprocal Trade and Investment Agreement. Announced on 13 November 2025, days after legislative elections in Argentina, the deal was negotiated in haste and in secret thanks to the good political relations between Milei and Trump. From the time of the announcement of the general framework to the signing of the final text, only three months passed – a record for this kind of legal instrument, which covers tariffs, non-tariff barriers, intellectual property, health regulations, digital trade, investments in strategic sectors and national security clauses.
While the word “reciprocal” has been included in the title of the trade agreement, a careful examination of its text shows that “reciprocity” is but a fiction. Argentina’s obligations appear over a hundred times in the document, following the imperative command “Argentina shall”: Argentina shall eliminate import licensing, shall accept US standards, shall facilitate investment, shall adopt additional security measures and shall alter its regulatory framework. The US’s commitments, on the other hand, are vague and not binding: the US “shall work (…) to consider supporting investment financing” and “shall review” its tariffs on steel and aluminium. Only 5% of the binding commitments in the agreement fall on the US. The rest impose an extensive list of conditions on Argentina ranging from the immediate removal of trade barriers to the modification of national laws on pharmaceuticals, seeds, the environment and state enterprises.
Within this deeply asymmetrical architecture, Section 4 of Annex III of the agreement contains a set of clauses on critical minerals and energy that give the Incentives Regime for Large Investments (RIGI) a central role. The RIGI is not merely mentioned a few times in passing: it appears as the institutional framework through which Argentina’s commitments on extractive investments are to be channelled. The clauses in this section reveal three fundamental aspects of the deal: the centrality of the RIGI as a mechanism for facilitating foreign investment, the accord’s anti-China geopolitical component and the conflicts it generates with the web of existing bilateral investment treaties (BITs).
The RIGI as the centrepiece of the investment agreement
Since the establishment of the RIGI by the Bases Act (Law no. 27,742), social and environmental organizations have been warning that it is not just an investment promotion regime. It serves as a universalized bilateral investment treaty, as it grants all investors admitted to the regime (national and foreign) protections that are equal to or stronger than the ones provided by the BITs signed by Argentina in the 1990s. The agreement with the US clearly confirms this interpretation.
Article 4.1.2 of Annex III states that “Argentina commits to fast tracking applications for eligible projects through the Incentives Regime for Large Investments (RIGI) program.” This clause elevates the RIGI from a domestic regulation to an international commitment; it is no longer a sovereign policy decision that Argentina can alter unilaterally. By incorporating it into a bilateral agreement, any substantial changes to the regime, delays in approval deadlines or limits on its scope could be interpreted as a treaty violation.
The RIGI already guarantees fiscal stability for 30 years, freedom from foreign exchange constraints, tax exemptions and protection from regulatory changes. By using this deal to internationalize the regime, the Argentine government is shielding the RIGI from the decisions of democratic governments in the future. Any future government that wishes to review the RIGI will not only have to bear the internal political costs of changing a law, but also expose itself to claims from the US for failure to comply with the trade agreement.
But the centrality of the RIGI in the agreement goes beyond fast tracking. Article 4.1.1 stipulates that “Argentina shall work with provincial governments to facilitate investment by U.S. companies in critical mineral projects”. This means that the national government agrees to act as a political mediator with provincial governments and intervene to resolve conflicts over environmental permits, municipal taxes or local resistance movements. To this, article 4.1.3 adds: Argentina commits to investing public funds in mining infrastructure “to enable access to the mining sector for U.S. companies”. The Argentine state must thus use public resources to build roads and power lines and provide other logistical support to increase the profitability of foreign private companies. The result is a scheme where the state socializes the costs and privatizes the benefits and the RIGI serves as the institutional framework facilitating all of this.
The geopolitical dimension: an anti-China agreement
The clauses of Annex III on critical minerals must be put into their geopolitical context to be understood. Article 4.1.4 is explicit: “Argentina intends to prioritize the United States as a trade and investment partner for copper, lithium, and other critical minerals (…) over market manipulating economies or enterprises.” The mention of “market manipulating economies” is an obvious euphemism: it refers to China.
By agreeing to this clause, Argentina officially accepts the US’s narrative by which Chinese investments in strategic minerals are tools of “economic manipulation”. This has concrete consequences: according to the agreement, even if the terms offered by a Chinese state enterprise for lithium or copper mining rights are more advantageous, the Argentine government must still favour US capital. This logic puts geopolitical alignment before economic rationality.
The reference to the RIGI in this framework is thus for geopolitical purposes. By fast tracking the projects of US corporations, the RIGI will function as a mechanism to grant them preferential access to Argentina’s strategic resources. The US’s aim is to integrate Argentina into its critical minerals supply chain under the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), which requires companies to source electric vehicle components from “trusted trading partners” in order to access federal subsidies. The RIGI is the tool that ensures that Argentina fulfils this role.
Yet, this creates a direct conflict with Argentina’s Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with China. If Argentina agrees that China is a “market manipulating economy” and commits to putting US investments first, it could trigger trade or financial reprisals, such as a halt to Chinese soy or meat purchases or demands for early repayment of the tranches activated in the currency swap. Argentina is caught in a diplomatic conundrum that is hard to resolve because of an agreement that subordinates its foreign policy to Washington’s agenda.
A mega-BIT that opens the door to new arbitration lawsuits
Perhaps the gravest and least visible consequence of these provisions is how they contradict Argentina’s 48 BITs currently in force. These treaties include clauses on national treatment, most favoured nation treatment (MFN) and fair and equitable treatment that apply to the investments of signatory countries. The commitment to fast track and give preferential treatment to US investments through the RIGI will lead Argentina to discriminate against investors from third countries that are entitled to similar protections under their respective country’s BITs.
This is how the mechanism works: if Argentina fast tracks a US mining investor’s application and gives their project priority for approval and the national government’s support in dealing with the provinces, then a Canadian, Chinese, German or Australian investor operating in the same sector could argue that the Argentine government’s actions are arbitrary and discriminatory. Under the MFN clause included in practically all of Argentina’s BITs, this investor would have the right to demand the same favourable treatment. If they do not receive it, they can resort to filing an international arbitration claim against Argentina.
The agreement with the US thus functions as a mega-BIT: not only does it grant US investors protections that are equal to or greater than those of existing BITs, but by doing so, it destabilizes the entire network of treaties in effect. By adding the commitment to fast track US investments via the RIGI and prioritize them over those of “market manipulating economies”, Argentina creates a privileged regime that, paradoxically, exposes it to new lawsuits filed by investors from all the other countries with which it has signed a BIT.
Conclusions
The clauses of Annex III on critical minerals confirms what we have been saying all along: the RIGI is a central component of a legal-political architecture that redefines the relationship between the Argentine state, transnational capital and sovereignty over natural resources. The RIGI’s incorporation into the agreement with the US internationalizes it and shields it, and its link it to the geopolitical provisions in the deal turns it into a tool of alignment with Washington. What is more, the conflict that it generates with existing BITs creates new grounds for arbitration claims.
In short, this agreement was negotiated behind closed doors, without consulting any other sector of society, signed in record time and presented as a “reciprocal” deal, despite that over 95% of the obligations fall on Argentina. Designed as a domestic regime, the RIGI is to be incorporated into a web of international commitments that drastically reduce public policy space and expose the country to enormous fiscal, diplomatic and legal costs.
